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Case Memorial Lecture 
Albany Law School 
November 12, 1987 
Roger J. Miner 
U.S. Circuit Judge 
THE TENSIONS OF A DUAL COURT SYSTEM 
AND SOME PRESCRIPTIONS FOR RELIEF* 
For nearly two hundred years, our federal constitutional 
structure has been subject to some significant strains arising 
out of the need to maintain a proper balance of power between 
state and national governments. Nowhere has the stress been more 
evident than in the problems generated by the side-by-side 
existence of federal and state courts. The United States Supreme 
Court recently referred to "the tensions inherent in a system 
that contemplates parallel judicial processes."! It is my 
purpose to discuss some of those tensions, to review the measures 
that have been established to alleviate them, and to suggest some 
other palliative approaches grounded in the principles of comity 
and federalism of which the Supreme Court so often speaks.. My 
discussion will focus on frictions produced by the exercise of 
federal court jurisdiction in cases involving diversity of 
citizenship, habeas corpus, civil rights, criminal law and 
attorney discipline. 
The potential for friction between state and federal court 
systems was foreseen early on. James Madison's Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention records the following comments made 
during the debate over the provision for inferior federal courts: 
Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such 
tribunals. The State Tribunals might do the 
business .. 
Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create 
jealousies and opposition in the State Tribunals, 
with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.2 
Ultimately, of course, the Constitution provided for "such 
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish."3 Alexander Hamilton attempted to downplay the 
potential for conflict in the dual court system spawned by this 
provision. In No. 81 of the Federalist Papers, he wrote that 
"the authority of the judicial department .. has been 
carefully restricted to those cases which are manifestly proper 
for the cognizance of the national judicature."4 Acknowledging, 
however, that there was a question as to 11 What relation would 
subsist between the national and state courts in 
. instances of concurrent jurisdiction,"5 he indicated that 
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 
in respect of both court systems, would resolve such problems as 
might arise.6 The only purpose of having inferior courts, 
according to Hamilton, was "to obviate the necessity of having 
recourse to the supreme court, in every case of federal 
cognizance."7 
What Hamilton never contemplated was inferior federal court 
interference with state court decisions and decision-making 
through the exercise of an expanded federal question jurisdiction 
granted by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court. Hamilton 
was not even very prescient in his explanation of how conflicts 
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inherent in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction would be 
resolved. The explanation he provided failed to answer the 
following question, posed in one of the anti-federalist essays: 
If the State courts ha~e concurrent 
jurisdiction with the inferior federal 
courts, ..• is it not self-evident that 
there may be different adjudications on the 
SAME question • • . if decided in the 
inferior federal court with an appeal, [or] 
if decided in a State court without any 
appeal, to the supreme federal court?8 
There was extended debate in Congress prior to the adoption 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created an inferior federal 
court system consisting of district and circuit courts as 
authorized by the newly-ratified Constitution.9 Those who 
foresaw conflict with the state courts opposed adoption of the 
Act. One congressman, with obvious sarcasm, "asked whether the 
people could ever consider such an accumulation of courts of 
justice calculated to promote their interest."lO He answered his 
rhetorical question by saying "he was sure, under the 
circumstances, the freemen of America could never submit to 
it.nll Another congressman predicted disaster in these words: 
"[S]eparate jurisdiction will twine into such a state of 
perplexity, as to render it impossible for human wisdom to 
disentangle it without injurye"l2 He pointed to the historical 
example of the English courts that "put the whole community in 
commotion with the clashing of their jurisdictions."l3 
The concurrent authority of state and federal courts to 
resolve controversies between citizens of different states often 
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produces the type of clashing referred to in the Judiciary Act 
debates. The original reasons for the establishment of diversity 
of citizenship jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts are 
unclear. In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, John Marshall 
opined that, although such jurisdiction was not absolutely 
essential in general, it might prove to be needed in connection 
with "the laws and regulations of commerce" and "in cases of 
debt, and some other controversies."l4 A similar concern with 
commerce was expressed at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention 
by James Wilson, who there spoke of the need to provide a "just 
and impartial tribunal" as a means of restoring publ.ic and 
private credit and of providing "security . . . for the regular 
discharge of contracts."lS Hamilton's argument in the matter 
was based on the need to maintain an "equality of privileges and 
immunities" in cases where citizens of one state are opposed to 
the citizens of another state.l6 Although it has been disputed, 
the most commonly accepted reason for conferring diversity 
jurisdiction on the federal courts has been the fear of prejudice 
to out-of-state litigants.l7 In any event, diversity 
jurisdiction has been with us in one form or another since the 
original Judiciary Act was adopted pursuant to Article III of the 
Constitution. At least until general federal question 
jurisdiction was conferred in 1875,18 it apparently accounted for 
a substantial portion of the business of the federal courts. 
wbatever the reason for its establishment, diversity 
jurisdiction presently is a source of substantial tension between 
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state and federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels. 
It is not at all unusual for a plaintiff to commence an action 
based on diversity jurisdiction in the federal district court 
that is in all respects similar to an action already commenced in 
the state court, or vice versa. Attorneys find it most difficult 
to explain to their clients the reason for the double expense 
necessarily incurred in defending the same action in two courts. 
The potential for conflict increases as each case progresses, 
because there are two judges monitoring discovery, hearing 
motions and scheduling the procedural steps leading to trial. 
When a case finally reaches a conclusion by the entry of judgment 
in one court, the doctrine of res judicata concludes the case in 
the other court,l9 rendering useless all the time, money and 
effort expended in the second court. Another area of conflict in 
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diversity cases is the invocation of the removal statute,20 which 
provides for the transfer of such cases from state to federal 
courts at the mere demand of a defendant. It is, of course, the 
Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution21 that allows 
Congress to enact a statute permitting the ouster of state court 
jurisdiction by this means. 
The greatest tension between state and federal court systems 
in diversity cases, however, occurs when there are different 
adjudications of the same issue by courts of concurrent 
jurisdiction, a problem referred to in the anti-federalist essay 
quoted earlier.22 Although conflicting rules of decision are not 
uncommon where there is concurrent jurisdiction, this particular 
tension supposedly was relieved in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,23 when 
the Supreme Court determined that federal courts must apply state 
substantive law in diversity cases. Nevertheless, the 
application of state law by the federal courts can present 
serious difficulties when a state's highest court has not yet 
resolved a specific issue or when state decisional law seems to 
be moving in a new direction. The rule in such cases seems to be 
that the federal court must predict what the highest state court 
would do when confronted with the question.24 In the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, we "make our best estimate" of what the 
state's highest court would do, giving consideration to "all the 
resources" that court could use, including the decisions of other 
jurisdictions.25 Should the prediction be wrong, the inevitable 
consequence is not only tension between the court systems but 
also a losing federal litigant who could have prevailed by 
pressing the issue to conclusion in the state court system. 
The devices heretofore used to relieve diversity tensions 
caused by conflicting decisions, or the desire to avoid them, 
have proved less than satisfactory. The device of judgment 
modification, for example, is highly impractical. Federal court 
diversity judgments cannot be modified every time a state supreme 
court changes direction and undermines the basis for the federal 
judgments. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has gone 
as far as to recall its mandate in order to modify a judgment 
after a state supreme court reversal of an intermediate appellate 
court decision upon which the Circuit had relied,26 the process 
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employed is an especially cumbersome one. It also rests almost 
entirely in the court's discretion and is less likely to be used 
as time passes following the entry of judgment.27 There is also 
a question as to what sources of state law can form the basis for 
modification. One district court suggested that an unreported 
decision of the Tennessee Chancery Court might impel the Second 
Circuit to grant a rehearing in a diversity case to correct its 
earlier estimate of Tennessee law!28 Strangely enough, the 
Second Circuit estimate was based on a Sixth Circuit evaluation 
of the descendibility of the right of publicity in the state of 
Tennessee.29 It was made in the context of a dispute over the 
right to exploit the name and likeness of Elvis Presley, 
apparently a valuable property right.30 
Federal courts also have invoked the doctrine of abstention 
as a means of avoiding interference with the administration of 
state law by state courts and of maintaining consistency in the 
decisional law. However, the very limited circumstances in which 
abstention can be applied in diversity cases has restricted its 
value as a tension reliever. While the Supreme Court has allowed 
federal courts to abstain from the exercise of their diversity 
jurisdiction when state law was unclear,31 it also has spoken of 
"the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them."32 Although the Court has 
approved deference to state tribunals when difficult and 
important questions of state law transcend the results in a 
particular case,33 it also has held "that difficulties and 
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perplexities of state law are no reason for referral of the 
problem to the state court."34 In the face of these conflicting 
signals from the Supreme Court, commentators have been vociferous 
in their condemnation of any yielding of federal court 
jurisdiction through the judicially created doctrine of 
abstention.35 Deference to parallel state court proceedings for 
reasons of wise judicial administration and economy of judicial' 
resources especially have been criticized for failure to 
recognize the jurisdictional responsibilities of federal courts 
as mandated by Congress.36 In its most recent pronouncement on 
this type of abstention, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
deference to state court litigation involves the balancing of a 
number of factors, "with the balance heavily weighted in favor of 
the exercise of jurisdiction."37 
A preferred means of avoiding the clash of different rules 
of decision in diversity cases is the certification of questions 
of law by federal courts to state courts. The problem with this 
procedure is that, for the most part, acceptance of the inquiry 
is discretionary with the highest court of the state, and 
certification may come only from a Circuit Court or the United 
States Supreme Court. The jurisdiction recently conferred on the 
New York Court of Appeals to review certified state law questions 
is limited in this fashion.38 Although the New York Court of 
Appeals already has accepted two certifications from the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals,39 it has rejected such a question on 
one occasion.40 The rejection understandably was grounded in the 
Q 
policy of New York's highest court to address important questions 
of state law only after they were filtered through the lower and 
intermediate appellate courts.41 
More out of concern for the burgeoning caseload of 
the federal courts than for the tensions of a dual court system, 
numerous proposals to modify diversity jurisdiction have been 
made over the years. In 1965 the American Law Institute proposed 
that plaintiffs be barred from bringing diversity actions in 
their home states; that business enterprises be prohibited from 
invoking diversity jurisdiction, either originally or by removal, 
in any state where they maintain a local establishment; and that 
natural persons be denied access to the federal courts in the 
state where they have their principal place of business or 
employment.42 There have been proposals that appeals to the 
United States Courts in diversity cases be made discretionary;43 
that diversity jurisdiction be abolished except in multi-party 
tort cases;44 that federal courts be authorized to abstain in 
diversity cases if adequate and timely state remedies exist;45 
and that a system for the mandatory arbitration of diversity 
claims be established.46 
It seems to me, however, that total elimination of diversity 
jurisdiction is the best prescription for the relief of the 
tensions it causes. Although I have in the past suggested an 
increase in the amount in controversy as a compromise with those 
who are opposed to the complete elimination of diversity 
jurisdiction,47 I now am convinced that the time has come for 
a 
complete repeal. Diversity causes more trouble than it is worth. 
It fails a cost/benefit analysis and just about any other test 
that can be applied to it. Most of all, it creates unnecessary 
stress in our dual court system by making possible conflicting 
adjudications and procedural interferences. While the courts 
have been creative in fashioning the doctrine of abstention and 
in creating the domestic relations and probate exceptions to 
diversity jurisdiction,48 the limited reach of these devices 
makes it clear that congressional action is necessary. 
Whenever a single federal judge grants a writ of habeas 
corpus releasing a state prisoner whose conviction was affirmed 
by the state's highest court, there is a palpable strain in the 
dual court system. In such a case, the message from the inferior 
federal court to the state judges involved in the proceeding is 
as follows: "Although you have sworn to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States, you have failed to correct a violation of 
the federal constitutional rights of this defendant; you have 
failed in your trial court, in your intermediate appellate court, 
and in the highest tribunal of your system; and the fact that the. 
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari review is of no 
importance ... This message, of course, has been made possible by 
the congressional grant of power to federal judges to "entertain 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court only on the 
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States."49 As a consequence of 
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this provision, a significant portion of the workload of the 
federal judiciary is composed of habeas corpus challenges to 
state convictions.SO Representatives of the state court systems 
have not been hesitant in calling for repeal of federal court 
jurisdiction over these challenges.Sl 
Congress has provided for some alleviation of the tensions 
it created in the Habeas Corpus Act through certain provisions in 
the Act itself. The statute requires that state court remedies 
be exhausted52 and that state court fact-finding be presumed 
correct if certain criteria, such as a full, fair and adequate 
hearing, are met.S3 The statute also provides that no appeal 
from denial of the writ may be taken without a certificate of 
probable cause.54 Procedural rules have been adopted allowing 
for summary dismissal of facially insufficient habeas petitionsSS 
and for denial of the writ when delayed or successive petitions 
have been filed.S6 The Supreme Court has added some tension 
relieving elements through decisional law -- the rule that a 
state's contemporaneous objection requirement must be respected 
in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice;57 the rule 
that a Fourth Amendment claim will not form the basis for habeas 
relief if there was an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of the claim in the state court;58 and the rule prohibiting the 
joinder of exhausted and unexhausted claims.59 
Despite these measures, the clash of jurisdictions continues. 
At its last term, the Supreme Court was faced with the question 
of what law to apply when a successful habeas petitioner seeks 
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release pending the state's appea1.60 Referring to "traditional 
notions of federalism and comity, .. Justice Marshall, in dissent, 
wrote that state rules, as applied by state courts, should govern 
release Cor "enlargement" as it is called in the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure).61 For the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist enumerated various considerations that should prevail 
and rejected state law as the rule of decision.62 As to the 
federalism and comity concerns of the dissenters, he asserted 
that any strains in federal-state relations stemming from the 
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction "comes because of the 
granting of habeas relief itself, and not the existence of any 
discretion to refuse enlargement pending appeal.n63 
The sheer volume of frivolous habeas filings64 and the 
obvious confusion engendered by redundant adjudications,65 as 
well as the strains alluded to by the Chief Justice, have led to 
proposals to restrict further the scope of federal habeas 
jurisdiction. A bill recently introduced in Congress proposes a 
one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions 
(there presently is no limitation period), and a requirement 
that, prior to the consideration of any constitutional claim, 
there be a showing that the state court has not "fully and fairly 
adjudicated" the claim.66 In the past, the Justice Department 
has supported legislation limiting habeas to constitutional 
issues relating to fact-finding in the state courts;67 it also 
has supported legislation'requiring a showing of a basis for 
reasonable doubt as to guilt.68 Some Supreme Court Justices now 
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seem inclined to require a colorable demonstration of factual 
innocence in habeas petitions,69 and Professor Remington has made 
out a persuasive argument in support of his conclusion that 
n[f]ocusing on the possibility of innocence seems clearly best 
from the point of view of the state prisoner and the state 
correctional program."70 
Although I previously have prescribed a five-year 
limitations period, measured from the exhaustion of state 
remedies, for the relief of the tension caused by federal habeas 
jurisdiction,71 I now am convinced that stronger medicine is 
necessary. If there is to be true equality and mutual respect in 
a parallel system of courts, there is no room for double 
adjudications of the same issues in a single case. Since the 
United States Supreme Court stands at the apex of each system for 
the adjudication of federal constitutional issues, it seems 
especially ludicrous to allow the lowest court in the federal 
system to tell the highest court in the state system that it is 
wrong on the law. Accordingly, I suggest that the proposal 
advanced by Justice Jackson, Albany Law School's most 
distinguished student, is most worthy of examination. 
The Jackson proposal is set forth in his concurring opinion 
in Brown v. Allen as follows: 
My conclusion is that whether or not this 
Court has denied certiorari from a state 
court's judgment in a habeas corpus 
proceeding, no lower federal court should 
entertain a petition except on the following 
conditions: (1) that the petition raises a 
jurisdictional question involving federal law 
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on which the state law allowed no access to 
its courts, either by habeas corpus or appeal 
from the conviction, and that he therefore 
has no state remedy; or (2) that the petition 
shows that although the law allows a remedy, 
he was actually improperly obstructed from 
making a record upon which the question could 
be presented, so that his remedy by way of 
ultimate application to this Court for 
certiorari has been frustrated. There may be 
circumstances so extraordinary that I do not 
now think of them which would justify a 
departure from this rule, but the run-of-the-
mill case certainly does not.72 
Although this formula may seem too restrictive to many, it seems 
to me that it is an excellent prescription for the relief of 
habeas corpus tension. Moreover, the prescription is not an 
untested one, for there was a time when only jurisdictional 
challenges were permitted by way of habeas corpus.73 
The post-Civil War civil rights statute,74 now codified as 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a cause of action for deprivation of a 
federal constitutional or statutory right under color of state 
law. Since 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act, in one form or 
another, has prohibited federal court stays of state court 
proceedings,75 but section 1983 has been held to fall within one 
of the Act's exceptions.76 Accordingly, federal court intrusion 
into the processes of a state court is considered permissible 
when deemed necessary to redress civil rights violations 
infecting those processes.77 
The inevitable tensions caused by intervention under the 
authority of section 1983 have impelled the Supreme Court to 
formulate the doctrine commonly known as "Younger Abstention."78 
1 L1 
The doctrine, named for the case of Younger v. Harris,79 
prohibits federal courts from enjoining pending state court 
proceedings except on a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any 
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable 
relief."80 The doctrine is grounded in the principal of comity, 
which Justice Black defined in Younger as "a proper respect for 
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire 
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and 
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will 
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to 
perform their separate functions in their separate ways."Bl 
Referring to the dual system of government envisioned by the 
Framers, Justice Black emphasized the need for sensitivity to the 
interests of both systems.82 Most importantly, he warned that 
"the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate 
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always [must] 
endeavor[] to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with 
the legitimate activities of the States.n83 In defining 
"comity," Justice Black was expressing his concern for the 
survival of the concept of federalism. In doing so, he 
articulated a means by which dual court tension could be 
alleviated when state court proceedings are threatened by federal 
court application of section 1983. 
Although Younger involved the denial of a federal court 
injunction against an ongoing state criminal prosecution, the 
doctrine it enunciated has been extended, most recently in 
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Pennzoil v. Texaco,84 to apply to civil proceedings as well. In 
Pennzoil the Supreme Court dealt with a district court order 
enjoining the plaintiff from enforcing a Texas state court 
judgment in its favor in the amount of approximately eleven 
billion dollars. Texaco contended that the judgment was in 
conflict with various federal constitutional provisions and that 
the Texas bond and lien provision, which would have required a 
bond of more than thirteen billion dollars to suspend execution 
of the judgment, also suffered from federal constitutional 
infirmities. The Supreme Court said that "[b]oth the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the 
significant interests harmed by their unprecedented intrusion 
into the Texas judicial system"85 and "should have abstained 
under the principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v. 
Harris.n86 The Court noted that the Texas courts could have 
resolved the issues in the case on state statutory or 
constitutional grounds and should have been afforded the 
opportunity to decide the federal constitutional claims as well. 
The Court also noted that the claims could have been advanced 
during a state court appeal that was pending at the time the 
federal injunction was issued. Moreover, the "open courts .. 
provision of the Texas Constitution at all times afforded access 
to the state courts for the resolution of issues that were not, 
but could have been, raised in those courts. In light of the 
access available, the Supreme Court concluded that "the lower 
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courts should have deferred on principles of comity to the 
pending state proceedings .. "87 
To me, the most interesting part of the Texaco decision is 
not the extension of the Younger doctrine to all cases that 
"involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels 
compliance with the judgments of its courts.n88 Rather, it is 
the suggestion of the merger of the abstention doctrines that 
grabs my attention. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun 
expressed his view that "the District Court should have abstained 
under the principles announced in Railroad Comm•n of Texas v. 
Pullman Co."89 Pullman abstention requires a federal court to 
defer ruling on a constitutional question pending a determination 
of state law issues by a state court, on the theory that such a 
determination may resolve the entire case.90 There are other 
abstention doctrines, some of which I have referred to earlier.91 
The point is that the Pennzoil majority, rejecting Pullman 
abstention for appellant's failure to argue it, said the 
following in a footnote: 
We merely note that considerations similar 
to those that mandate Pullman abstention are 
relevant to a courtis decision whether to 
abstain under Younger. . . . The various 
types of abstention are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must 
try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a 
complex of considerations designed to soften 
the tensions inherent in a system that 
contemplates parallel judicial processes.92 
I believe that this footnote holds the potential for much 
greater deference to the state courts under principles of 
federalism and comity.93 I think that the realization of this 
potential by the Supreme Court on a case-by-case basis will 
contribute greatly to a softening of the tensions between court 
systems arising from section 1983 litigation. There are others, 
of course, who would view the expansion of abstention in civil 
rights cases as a very negative development.94 
It is difficult to conceive of a conflict that causes more 
strain in the dual court system than a lawsuit, brought against a 
state judge in a federal court, relating to the judicial function 
of the state judge and alleging a civil rights violation. 
Although state judges, when engaged in the performance of 
judicial acts, are absolutely immune from liability for damages 
in civil rights actions,95 they "are not immune in § 1983 actions 
when they are sued for declaratory or injunctive -- rather than 
monetary -- relief."96 In such a case the Supreme Court has held 
that counsel fees may be recovered against the judge under the 
provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976.97 That holding came in a case in which the United States 
District Court enjoined a state magistrate from incarcerating 
people charged with non-jailable offenses who could not make 
bail.98 I find myself in agreement with Justice Powell's dissent 
in that case. He not only considered counsel fees barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity but went further to say the 
following: 
In sum, I see no principled reason why judicial 
immunity should bar suits for damages but not for 
prospective injunctive relief. The fundamental 
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rationale for providing this protection to the judicial 
office -- articulated in the English cases and repeated 
in decisions of this Court -- applies equally to both 
types of asserted relief. The underlying principle, 
vital to the rule of law, is assurance of judicial 
detachment and independence. Nor is the Court's 
decision today in the broader public interest that the 
doctrine of absolute immunity is intended to serve.99 
If the Supreme Court won't do it, Congress should provide by 
statute for the sort of judicial immunity envisioned by Justice 
Powell and thereby remove a great source of inter-court system 
tension. 
In the area of criminal law, duplicative prosecutions often 
cause conflict between state and federal courts. The same 
criminal conduct often forms the basis for prosecution under 
state law as well as federal law. Although some states, 
including New York, have statutory provisions prohibiting state 
prosecution after a prior federal prosecution,lOO the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the ConstitutionlOl has been held to be no bar 
to separate prosecution by two sovereign governments.l02 The 
upshot is a strange situation whereby courts are maneuvered by 
prosecutors into positions of conflict. For example, if a person 
charged with criminal conduct can be convicted in a New York 
court first, he or she can be prosecuted for the same criminal 
conduct in a federal court at a later time. There can then be 
two separate, consecutive sentences for what is in effect the 
same crime. Because of the New York statute, however, the 
converse is not true. At the behest of the prosecutor, the state 
court in such a situation would make every effort to schedule a 
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state trial first, even at the expense of disrupting the federal 
court's calendar and causing problems relating to compliance with 
the federal Speedy Trial Act.l03 Moreover, witnesses and defense 
lawyers cannot be present in two courts at the same time, a fact 
that exacerbates the tension. 
Aside from fairness concerns regarding double punishment and 
prudential concerns relating to the expense of double 
prosecution, the concept of dual sovereignty is not served by 
conflicts of this nature. Proposals to afford relief have been 
varied. One such proposal involves congressional preemption 
under the Supremacy Clause.l04 While Congress has the power to 
preempt state criminal statutes, it has done just the opposite by 
saving state jurisdiction in several statutes defining federal 
crimes.lOS Despite such a savings clause, however, 
Pennsylvania's Sedition Act was held to be displaced by the 
federal Smith Act, which prohibited the overthrow of the United 
States Government by force or violence.l06 
The Department of Justice has attempted to afford some 
relief through a policy "designed to limit the exercise of the 
power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to 
situations comporting with the rationale for the existence of 
that power."l07 This policy, however, "is not constitutionally 
mandated and confers no rights upon the accused."l08 An 
expansion of the policy to include a total prohibition against 
dual prosecution might be considered. 
Other proposals include allowing the defendant a choice of 
forums; prohibiting federal prosecution after state conviction; 
and simply prohibiting dual prosecution altogether.l09 My 
prescription in this area is state court jurisdiction over 
federal crimesllO in all cases where the same criminal activity 
is charged under both federal and state statutes. This 
prescription will relieve dual court tension, reduce the expense 
of multiple prosecutions and allow a single judge to impose one 
sentence for each instance of criminal misconduct. 
Federal courts are authorized by statute to establish rules 
regarding admission to practice and conduct of attorneys.lll 
They are also said to have "inherent power" in such matters.ll2 
Similar authority is considered to reside in the various state 
judiciaries, since the practice of law is so intertwined with the 
operation of the state courts.ll3 Reciprocity in disciplinary 
matters seems to be the norm, although state and federal courts 
have separate and distinct control over rules of admission and 
conduct.ll4 The rub comes when federal courts are asked to 
intrude in cases involving the discipline of attorneys by state 
courts. The Supreme Court was confronted with that exact problem 
in 1982 in a case involving disciplinary charges made against a 
New Jersey lawyer.ll5 The lawyer was accused of an ethical 
violation, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
as the result of certain comments he made to the press 
criticizing a trial and a trial judge. When the charges were 
made by a county ethics committee, he did not respond but instead 
?1 
filed an action in the United States District Court complaining 
that the disciplinary rules were overbroad and that they violated 
his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court posed these 
questions in his case: "first, do state bar disciplinary 
hearings within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of 
the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judicial 
proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state 
interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the 
state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges."ll6 
Answering all three questions in the affirmative, the Supreme 
Court held that the district court properly abstained from 
intervening in a disciplinary proceeding that was, in effect, a 
judicial matter being conducted under the aegis of the New·Jersey 
Supreme Court. The majority relied on the Younger doctrine, but 
Justice Brennan opined in his pre-Pennzoil concurrence that 
Younger generally is inapplicable to civil proceedings; he did 
say, however, "that federal courts should show particular 
restraint before intruding into an ongoing disciplinary 
proceeding by a state court against a member of the State's bar, 
where there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal issues in 
that proceeding."ll7 
The rule is a salutary one. As a district court judge, I 
abstained from considering an attorney's constitutional 
challenge to an Appellate Division determination that his 
disciplinary hearing should be closed. The attorney pursued the 
matter in the New York Court of Appeals and obtained a ruling 
there that the hearing should be open, if the attorney waived 
confidentiality, unless due cause for closure were 
demonstrated.ll8 New York's highest court found it unnecessary 
to address the constitutional question. Thus was the clash of 
courts avoided and balance in the dual court system maintained. 
The expansion of federal court jurisdiction inevitably has 
increased the conflict between state and federal courts.ll9 It 
seems to me that all prescriptions for relieving these tensions 
of our dual court system should be guided by the understanding 
that one court system is not superior to another, either 
hierarchicallyl20 or intellectually;l21 that there always will be 
some overlapping of jurisdiction;l22 that the goal of equal 
justice is superior to the goal of tension reduction; and that 
the federal system of government erected by the Framers still 
stands. 
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